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We document trends in higher education costs and tuition over the past 50 years.
To explain these trends, we develop and simulate a general equilibrium model with
skill- and sector-biased technical change. We assume that higher education suﬀers
from Baumol’s (1967) service sector disease, in that the quantity of labor and capital
needed to educate a student is constant over time. Calibrating the model, we show
that it can explain the rise in college costs between 1959 and 2000. We then use
the model to perform a number of numerical experiments. We ﬁnd, consistent with
a number of studies, that changes in the tuition discount rate have little long-run
eﬀect on college attainment.
1 Introduction
For most American families, the cost of a college education is a signiﬁcant expense.
College tuition has grown faster than inﬂation for decades. Attendance rates have slowed
∗We are grateful to Cristina De Nardi, Eric French, Suqin Ge, Hui He, Michael Sattinger, Chris Taber,
Gian Luca Violante, and seminar participants at McMaster University and the University at Albany for
helpful comments and discussions.
1even as the college wage premium has soared (Goldin and Katz, 2008). Many observers
fear that, in the words of a recent CNN headline (Censky, 2011), “surging college costs
price out [the] middle class”. In this paper, we develop a simple model that explains why
college costs have risen so dramatically, and consider its implications.
We begin by documenting trends in higher education costs and tuition over the past
40 years. The data show that the total cost of educating a student has risen at roughly
the same rate as per capita GDP. Since 1950, listed or “sticker price” tuition has grown
more quickly than GDP, while tuition net of grant aid has risen at the same rate. To
explain the cost trend, we develop and simulate a general equilibrium model with skill- and
sector-biased technical change. In our model, higher education suﬀers from the service
sector disease (Baumol and Bowen, 1966; Baumol, 1967). In particular, we assume
that the quantity of skilled labor needed to produce a college degree is constant across
time, even as it becomes more productive in other sectors. The data appear consistent
with such an assumption. For example, in 1976 there were 16.6 students for each college
faculty member; in 2009 the number had fallen to 16.0.1 As potential college professors
and administrators become more productive in other sectors, their wages, and the cost of
college education, will rise. Our model successfully replicates the dramatic increase in
higher education costs.
Our paper straddles two areas of research. The ﬁrst is the industry-level analysis of
higher education costs and tuition. There are a number of explanations for the increase
in college costs and tuition: Archibald and Feldman (2011) provide a lucid review. One
explanation is the service sector disease discussed above. An alternative explanation is
that institutions of higher education have become increasingly ineﬃcient. The ineﬃcien-
cies arise from market power and public subsidies that allow colleges to pad their expenses
(e.g., Bowen, 1980), or costly “arms races.” Harris and Goldrick-Rab (2010) argue that
because higher education practices are not objectively analyzed, signiﬁcant ineﬃciencies
almost surely exist. Other explanations focus on the tuition colleges charge, rather than
the costs they incur. One such explanation is increased price discrimination. Many in-
stitutions, especially private ones, post a “sticker price” well in excess of the discounted
tuition most students actually pay. Increasing the sticker price has allowed colleges to
oﬀer a broader menu of net prices, increasing their ability to price discriminate. Although
some students may face the full sticker price, the prices most students pay have risen more
slowly. Yet another explanation is that decreased public funding has forced schools to
raise tuition.
12010 Digest of Education Statistics, Table 254. Ratios expressed in full-time equivalent terms.
2In their recent book, Archibald and Feldman (2011) conclude that the service sector
disease plays a central role. They show that the cost trajectory of higher education is
similar to that of other high-skill services, and that costs have risen rapidly at community
colleges as well as at Ivy-league institutions. We show that in a general equilibrium
model, this form of biased technical change generates an increase in college costs similar
to those actually observed. We believe our model can make quantitative predictions of
college tuition.
The second area of research consists of general equilibrium analyses of human capital
accumulation and earnings dynamics. Ljungqvist (1993) argues that because the cost of
providing education depends on the cost of skilled labor, education may be particularly
expensive in countries where the current level of educational attainment is low. In contrast
to Ljungqvist (1993), who uses theoretical arguments, most of this literature is quantita-
tive. In an inﬂuential paper, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998a) show that sustained
skill-biased technological change can explain the changes in education and earnings ob-
served over the past few decades. Lee and Wolpin (2006, 2010) consider similar topics.
Akyol and Athreya (2005) emphasize that investments in college are risky: drop-out rates
are high. Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2010) analyze tuition schedules that vary with
income and ability. Our contribution is to determine the cost of higher education within
the model, allowing it to adjust to economic events.
The paper most similar to ours is Castro and Coen-Pirani (2011), who also allow the
cost of college to be a direct function of the wage for skilled labor. The two papers diﬀer
along a number of modelling dimensions,2 and more important, in emphasis: we focus on
college costs, while Castro and Coen-Pirani focus on educational attainment.
In addition to explaining the cost trends, our model allows us to assess the eﬀect of
higher tuition on college attainment. The model suggests that the long-term eﬀects of
changing tuition subsidies are small. Increasing the tuition discount rate by 1% increases
enrollment by only 0.07%. Although many micro-level estimates, such as Dynarski (2003),
suggest a much higher elasticity, our ﬁndings are consistent with the structural literature.
As Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998b) emphasize, once the price of skilled labor is
allowed to adjust in general equilibrium, the eﬀects of policy changes are often muted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize historical
patterns of higher education costs and pricing. In Section 3, we describe our model. In
Section 4 we discuss how we calibrate the model. In Section 5, we use the model to
2Most notably, our model includes physical capital, while Castro and Coen-Pirani use a richer model
of human capital.
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perform a few policy experiments. In Section 6 we discuss some extensions to the model
and conclude.
2 Higher Education Data
In this section, we present data related to higher education: costs, prices, enrollment,
and returns. We use these data to motivate the structure of our model, and as calibration
targets for our quantitative exercises.
2.1 Expenditures and Tuition
In considering “college costs”, it is useful to distinguish between three distinct objects:
(1) expenditures, the costs incurred in educating students; (2) the listed or “sticker” price
for tuition; and (3) the net tuition students pay after receiving ﬁnancial aid.
The top line in Figure 1 shows real expenditures per full-time-equivalent (FTE) student
for the higher education sector, including 2-year, 4-year and graduate students. These
data are drawn from the U.S. Department of Education’s Digest of Education Statistics,
and converted to 2005 dollars with the GDP deﬂator. The data are measured over
4academic years, July 1 - June 30, which we index by the initial calendar year. Constructing
the full series requires several splices: prior to 1967, costs are measured on a per-fall-
enrollee basis, and after 1995 the data deﬁnitions were modiﬁed. We consider the subset
of costs included in the education and general category. Among the costs excluded from
this category are auxiliary operations such as dormitories.3 Average expenditures have
more than trebled over time, from under $5,000 in 1939 to over $18,000 today. Perhaps
the most notable feature of the series in that between 1969 and 1975 costs actually fell
slightly, before returning to their upward trend. Archibald and Feldman (2011) stress
that during this time period the U.S. was still in what Goldin and Margo (2005) call the
“Great Compression”, during which relative wages for educated workers fell.
The second line in the ﬁgures shows sticker price tuition per FTE over the same time
period. Consistent with the cost measures, we calculate sticker price tuition as tuition
revenues divided by FTE, again using data from the Digest of Education Statistics.4 This
series also requires splicing per-FTE and per-enrollee data. After falling between 1939
and 1949, sticker price tuition has risen more rapidly than expenditures. Most college
students, however, receive some form of grant aid, either from the institution itself, or
some external source such as the Federal government. Using data from the College Board
(2010), we calculate average student grant aid, exclusive of veterans beneﬁts.5 Subtracting
aid from sticker price tuition yields net tuition. The bottom line in Figure 1 shows net
tuition. Net tuition has grown more slowly over time than sticker prices, suggesting that
the increase in sticker prices is at least partly intended to increase the scope for price
discrimination. A striking feature of sticker price and especially net tuition is that they
are quite low relative to expenditures. Although state aid to public institutions has not
increased over time (in real per FTE terms), it is still signiﬁcant. Federal grants are also
a major source of income, even at private institutions.
Figure 2 shows the same costs and tuition as fractions of per capita GDP, which is
constructed from the national accounts and Census data (Council of Economic Advisors,
2010).6 These data show that, with the exception of 1939, education and general expen-
3One quirk of education and general expenditures is that they include institutional “scholarships and
fellowships”: rather than being deducted from tuition revenue, institutional aid is treated as an expense.
In the cost series shown in Figure 1 we deduct these expenses: the eﬀects of this adjustment are discussed
in the data appendix.
4The Digest of Education Statistics also includes undergraduate tuition indices, which begin in 1964-
65. We compare the tuition measures in the data appendix.
5Our calculations also omit tax beneﬁts. In recent years, the Federal income tax credits for higher
education have grown rapidly (College Board, 2010). Aid data for 1959 are found by extrapolating
backward from 1963.
6Consistent with the model below, our measure of population consists of people aged 16-64. Calculat-
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ditures have stayed between 28 and 32 percent of per capita GDP. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that higher education has enjoyed few, if any, productivity gains over
the past few decades. After falling dramatically between 1929 and 1949, sticker price
tuition has grown faster than GDP, while net tuition has grown at the same rate. The
net tuition ratio, being a function of averages, need not imply that higher education is as
“aﬀordable” today as it was in the past. Median income has grown far more slowly than
per capita GDP, and tuition varies widely across students (Leonhardt, 2009).
The data in Figures 1 and 2 are averages taken across both public and private insti-
tutions, with the latter including for-proﬁt institutions as well as traditional non-proﬁt
schools. These averages also combine data for 2-year and 4-year institutions. Figure 3
shows disaggregated expenditure data, expressed as a fraction of GDP. Perhaps the most
notable feature of the data is the sharp decline in private sector expenditures between
1995 and 2000. Given that the public sector shows no such decline, the break in the se-
ries probably reﬂects changes in the Department of Education’s data measures. Figure 3
also shows expenditures for non-proﬁt private institutions. In the recent decade for-proﬁt
institutions have grown rapidly, from 4 percent of private enrollment in 1980 to 29 percent
ing per capita GDP total population makes the series in Figure 2 more variable, but does not change their
general properties. To be consistent with academic years, we use averages of consecutive calendar-year
values.
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in 2008. Because for-proﬁt institutions tend to have lower costs, their growth has pulled
down average expenditures in the private sector. Although separate cost data for 2-year
and 4-year institutions are available only for public institutions, about 90 percent of 2-year
students are in public colleges. Figure 3 reveals that once 2-year public institutions are
excluded, public and private institutions have fairly similar levels of expenditure. Figure
3 also shows that the expenditures at 2-year colleges follow a trajectory similar to that
at 4-year institutions; Archibald and Feldman (2011) view this as evidence against the
“arms race” hypothesis.
Figure 4 displays disaggregated sticker price tuition. The data break in the late 1990s
appears to have an eﬀect here as well. However, the distinction between non-proﬁt and
for-proﬁt private institutions is modest. Although for-proﬁt institutions have lower costs,
they rely more heavily on tuition revenue. Since 1992, the ﬁrst year disaggregated revenue
data are available, tuition for 4-year public institutions has risen relative to tuition for
2-year public institutions; we use the 1992 tuition ratio to infer 4-year tuition for earlier
years.



































Private, Non-profit Private Public, 4-year Public
Figure 4
2.2 Staﬃng and Compensation
Table 1 shows staﬃng levels, measured as the ratio of students (in FTE) to employees
(in FTE), as shown in the Digest of Education Statistics. Both overall and faculty staﬃng
levels have remained roughly constant during the past three decades. The most notable
change has been a reduction in non-professional staﬀ in favor of non-faculty professionals.
Assuming that worker quality has stayed constant as well, these constant staﬃng levels
are consistent with our hypothesis that higher education has not enjoyed any eﬃciency
gains.
Turning to costs per worker, data from the Digest of Education Statistics shows that
faculty compensation has grown very slowly. Figure 5 shows that salaries for full-time
instructional faculty have in fact fallen relative to GDP. Controlling for faculty rank and
including beneﬁts (not rank-diﬀerentiated) does not change the trend. Figure 6 reveals
ongoing changes in faculty composition. The fraction of instructional faculty that are
full-time employees has fallen steadily, from 78% in 1970 to 51% in 2007. Figure 6 also
shows that during the 1960s and 1970s, the share of faculty and students associated with
2-year colleges increased.
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Table 1. Students per Employee
1976 1999 2009
All 5.4 4.8 5.4
Professional staﬀ 9.8 7.5 7.6
Administrative 84.0 69.9 68.5
Faculty 16.6 14.9 16.0
Graduate assistants 100.5 110.4 109.1
Other professionals 50.9 23.0 21.7
Non-professional staﬀ 11.9 13.4 18.6
Note: All quantities in FTE terms.
While these trends have almost surely reduced the growth in college costs, interpreting
them is diﬃcult. The trends may well reﬂect a decline in the human capital embodied in
college instructors. Alternatively, they may reﬂect idiosyncratic features in the specialized
academic job market. Moreover, it is not clear whether reductions in human capital
imply reductions in educational quality, as assumed by Castro and Coen-Pirani (2011), or
simply reductions in costs. In the model below, our identifying assumption will be that
providing a college education requires a ﬁxed amount of skilled labor, with no changes in
9Faculty and Student Composition:  
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either eﬃciency or quality.
The reduction of non-professional staﬀ in favor of non-faculty professionals has proba-
bly raised staﬃng costs. Unfortunately, the data do not provide compensation information
for non-instructional employees.
2.3 Capital
The Digest of Education Statistics reports total physical plant in the higher education
sector for the years 1929-30 through 1989-90. Unfortunately, these data do not divide
capital between “education and general uses”, as opposed to auxiliary “current fund” uses
such as dormitories. Table 2 shows real physical plant per FTE. While it varies greatly
from decade to decade, over the long-term physical plant is more or less constant. The
data show that because capital use is constant, while real wages are rising, user costs
(here calculated as 12 percent of plant) are a shrinking fraction of total current fund
expenditures.
10Table 2. Expenditures and Physical Plant
Expenditures
Current Education Physical User Cost /
Fund & General Plant CF Expenses
1929-30 5.59 4.16 22.76 48.9%
1939-40 6.60 5.11 26.95 49.0%
1949-50 7.97 6.06 17.04 25.6%
1959-60 10.53 8.81 25.47 29.0%
1969-70 14.02 11.22 28.04 24.0%
1979-80 14.66 11.47 21.57 17.6%
1989-90 19.43 15.23 23.75 14.7%
Note: Costs are measured in 1,000s of $2005 per FTE.
2.4 College Attainment and Earnings
Moving to the demand side of the higher education market, Table 3 presents college
attainment for the past 70 years, using Census data.7 In any given decade, the edu-
cational achievement of workers less than 25 years old is projected by the achievement
of 30- to 34-year-olds in the next decade. This means, for example, 27.8% of the 20-
to 24-years in 1960 attended college in the following decade. Because most people have
completed their undergraduate studies by the time they reach 30, this is a good projection
of ultimate educational attainment. Table 3 shows that the growth in college attendance
is diminishing. For example, the fraction of people aged 25 or older that attended college
rose from 32 percent in 1980 to 45 percent in 1990, an increase of 13 percentage points.
Between 2000 and 2010, attendance grew by only 4 percentage points. In contrast, the
fraction of people completing at least a Bachelor’s degree continues to grow.8
Another piece of the puzzle is earnings. Census data indicate that in 1961, men
who had attended college earned 46 percent more than high school graduates. By 2000,
the premium had risen to 65 percent. During the same period, the earnings premium
among those with least a Bachelors degree (relative to a high school diploma) rose from
65 percent to 107 percent. This rise in college premia is well-known. While the premia
reﬂect diﬀerences in ability as well as human capital accumulation, they suggest that the
7Data through 2000 are from the Decennial Censuses. Data for 2010 are from the Current Population
Survey.
8Table 1 shows that the fraction of college attendees receiving a Bachelors degree has grown modestly,
from 46 percent in 1940 to 54 percent in 2010.
11returns to college are at a minimum not decreasing.
Table 3. College Attainment Rates (percent)
Attended College Bachelors+
25+ 30-34 25+ 30-34
1940 10.1 NA 4.6 6.3
1950 13.6 16.3 6.2 7.4
1960 16.5 21.5 7.7 10.9
1970 21.3 27.8 10.7 14.4
1980 31.9 46.7 16.2 24.6
1990 45.2 55.1 20.3 24.3
2000 51.8 57.9 24.4 27.9
2010 55.9 61.1 29.9 34.1
2.5 Key Findings
Our review of the data reveals several trends:
• Expenditures per college student tend to grow at the same rate as per capita GDP.
• Since World War II, sticker price tuition has grown faster than GDP, while tuition
net of grant aid has grown at the same rate.
• Since at least 1976, staﬃng at institutions of higher education has remained con-
stant, although there have been changes in its composition.
• Capital per student has remained more or less constant over time.
• Between 1940 and 2010, educational attainment, whether measured by attendance
or 4-year degrees, more than quintupled.




We consider an economy with two sectors: the goods-producing sector and an educa-
tion sector. The goods sector produces output (Y ) using two skill categories of workers,
12white-collar and blue-collar, and homogeneous capital. Speciﬁcally, production is given
by the following nested CES form
Y = AK
α[ωW







1−ς + (1 − ω)B
1−ς]
1/(1−ς), (1c)
where B denotes total units of blue-collar skill, W denotes white-collar skill, L denotes
total labor inputs, K denotes capital, and A indexes aggregate productivity. The para-
meter ς governs the substitutability between white- and blue-collar labor (the elasticity
of substitution is 1/ς). Heckman, et al. (1998a) estimate a version of this model where
K and L are also nested in a CES aggregator, but ﬁnd the elasticity of substitution for
these two factors is close to 1. To capture skill-biased and skill-neutral technical change,
we allow the weight ω and the shifter A to vary over time.
Firms are perfectly competitive. The equilibrium pricing conditions are:



























where r is the real interest rate, δ is the depreciation rate, and wB and wW are the unit











Individuals live from ages 18 to 64, for a total of T = 47 periods. Each individual
is endowed with the ability level h. At the beginning of their lives, individuals choose
whether to spend 4 periods attending college. If the individual chooses not to go to
college, he works as a unskilled labor with human capital h. If the individual chooses to
13attend college, he becomes a “skilled” agent and his human capital is
γ(h) = γ0[h + γ1(h − γ2)
3].
The shape of this transformation draws on Heckman et al.’s (1998a, Tables I and II)
estimates of how earnings vary by ability and education. Assume unskilled workers work
LB hours per year on average, and skilled workers work LW hours. Let yB
h denote the
earnings of an individual of type h, with “raw” human capital h, if she works as unskilled
worker: yB
h = h   wB   LB. Let yW
h denote the earnings of the same individual when she
works as skilled worker: yW
h = γ(h)   wW   LW.
We assume that an individual’s preferences are given by the discounted value of her
lifetime earnings, net of college costs. This implies that UW
h and UB
h , the returns from























where β is the discount factor.
Individuals can borrow and lend freely at the rate r. The decision to go to college
thus depends only on the cost and the expected returns to college. Let c denote annual
cost, and C = c
￿3
t=0 β
t ≡ NCc the lifetime cost, of college. Suppose that students pay
the fraction d of this cost, with the remainder funded by lump-sum taxes.9 An individual
is indiﬀerent between going to college and not if the expected utility gain from going to






















Therefore an individual chooses to go to college if and only if h > h∗.
9Given our assumptions of linear preferences and full credit access, we will ignore these transfers in
our discussion.
143.3 Higher education sector
Converting a blue-collar worker into a white-collar worker requires skilled labor and
capital. The cost of these inputs are their outside opportunity costs, namely the wage





K(r + δ), (8)
where EW is the number of skilled labor units devoted to each student in a year, and EW




























Each individual begins life with a draw of human capital, h, from a log-normal distri-
bution: ln(h) ∼ N( ,σ2). Let
e = 1 − F(h
∗), (10)
denote the fraction of the population that attends or has attended college.
3.5 Equilibrium
We will work with an open economy framework, taking the interest rate r as given.
Deﬁnition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is given by: the capital stock K and the labor
quantities W and B; the skill threshold h∗; the wage rates wB and wW; and a distribution
of people from age 18 to 64, m(h), such that the following conditions hold:
(i) Given the interest rate and the wages, h∗ is consistent with equation (7).


















(iii) The price of each factor equals its marginal product. That is, equations (2), (3),
(4) hold.
15An important equilibrium statistic is mwr, the ratio of the average wage for college-














Because the parameters of the model are shifting over time, the actual economy is in
a transition path where the fraction of the population enrolled is increasing over time.
This can be crudely approximated in our model by distinguishing between the current
enrollment rate e1 and the education attainment rate of older workers, e0. Associated
with these enrollment rates are the skill cutoﬀs h1 and h0. We proceed as follows:
1. h1 is found by solving equation (9); we are assuming agents are myopic. h0 is found
by inserting e0 — which is taken as given — into equation (10).










[1 − F(h1)] +
43
47
[1 − F(h0)]. (14)































4. The equilibrium is deﬁned much as before, replacing (10), (11) and (16) with (14),



















We calibrate the model assuming the economy is in transition, taking the enrollment
of the older cohort, e0, as given. Our target years are 1959-60 and 2000-01.
16We pick the following parameters from the data described above or from other studies:
δ = 0.08; r = 0.04; β = 1/(1 + r); LW = LB = 1; ς = 0.7 (Heckman et al., 1998, Table
III, OLS); d1959 = 0.2363; d2000 = 0.2426; e1959
0 = 0.077 (1960 value); e2000
0 = 0.244; and
EK = 18,573. The capital requirement EK is found by scaling the capital ﬁgures in
Table 3 by the ratio of education and general to current-fund expenditures, and taking
the average. We are measuring college attainment as the fraction of the population with
at least a 4-year degree. We assume that the capital-output ratio is constant at 2.666,
its average value since 1929.
We use the year-1959 and year-2000 values of {Y,K,e,c,mwr}, and year-1959 values of




We do this in three steps:




match the following 7 moments in 1959: aggregate capital K, aggregate output
Y , cost of higher education c, fraction enrolled e1, mean wage ratio mwr, and the
labor inputs W and B, both of which are 1. The ﬁnal two targets are a normal-
ization; as Lee and Wolpin (2010) point out, W and B are not identiﬁed separately
from A and ω. To evaluate equations (15) and (16), we use formulas for the moments
of truncated distributions found in Jawitz (2004).
2. We use the year-2000 values of {Y,K,e}, to ﬁnd h∗, K, W, B, wW, wB, and the
parameters {A2000,ω2000,α2000}.
3. Finally, we iterate over σ and γ2 (repeating steps 1 and 2), to minimize the distance

















Perhaps the most important calibration target in this process is the level of college
costs, c. Our preferred measure of costs excludes both institutional aid and 2-year
institutions.10 Table 4 shows this measure, which appears as Case 4, is an intermediate
case.
10Separate cost data for 2-year and 4-year institutions are ﬁrst available in the Digest of Education
statistics in 1977, and then only for public institutions. However, about 90 percent of 2-year students
are in public institutions, and if one is willing to assume the ratio of 2-year to 4-year costs is constant
over time, one can use attendence data to make an approximate adjustment.
17Table 4: College Expenditures as a Fraction of GDP
Institutional Aid 2-year Institutions (c/Y )1959 (c/Y )2000
Case 1 Included Included 32.77% 33.09%
Case 2 Included Excluded 35.04% 40.13%
Case 3 Excluded Included 31.56% 29.77%
Case 4 Excluded Excluded 33.70% 35.74%
4.2 Results
Table 5 shows the value of parameters estimated from the model. Between 1959 and
2000, skill-neutral technology, A, increases by 55%. The weight on white-collar skill in
the labor composite, ω, increases from 0.1085 to 0.2925. The weight on capital, α, stays
the same, which follows from equation (2) under a constant capital-output ratio and a
constant interest rate.
Table 5. Calibrated Parameters
Values
Parameters in 1959 in 2000
A skill-neutral productivity level 749 1,162
α weight on capital 0.3199 0.3199
ω weight on white-collar skill in composite 0.1085 0.2925
γ0 cubic production function of skill 12.382
γ1 cubic production function of skill 46.119
γ2 shifter in production function of skill 1.3515
  mean of log ability 0.0959
σ standard deviation of log ability 0.0688
EW skilled labor units per student per year 3.4383
Table 6 assesses the model’s ﬁt of the calibration targets. The model matches all the
data moments. The rapid growth in the mean wage ratio suggests that higher educa-
tion, being skill-intensive, should become increasingly expensive relative to GDP. This
tendency is oﬀset by capital costs, which are constant in absolute terms and decreasing
relative to GDP. The oﬀsetting forces allow the model to replicate the observed growth
in college expenditures, while holding constant the resources devoted to each student.
18Table 6. Data and model moments
Y K c mwr e1
in 1959 data 26,740 71,280 9,010 1.651 0.144
model 26,740 71,280 9,010 1.651 0.144
in 2000 data 61,290 163,400 21,890 2.074 0.341
model 61,290 163,400 21,890 2.074 0.341
Note: Output and capital per worker and college costs per
student are measured in $2005.
5 Experiments
Between 1959 and 2000, three parameters changed: the skill weight ω, the productivity
parameter A, and the tuition discount factor d. To assess the eﬀects of each parameter,
we perform a decomposition exercise, solving the model at its 1959 parameter values,
and then changing each of the three parameters in isolation. First we look at skill-biased
technological change (ω), then Hicks-neutral technological change (A), and ﬁnally, change
in tuition discount rate d.
5.1 In Transition
We assume that in both 1959 and 2000, the economy is in transition. In each experi-
ment we ﬁx e2000
0 = 0.244 as in the data. We can think of each change as an unexpected
shock which aﬀects the economy in 2000, but not the enrollment decisions made by previ-
ous cohorts. Appendix 7.2 provides a detailed description of the computation precedure.
Table 7 shows how the aggregate moments change in the full model and in each ex-
periment. Enrollment, for both the youngest cohort and for all ages (e, given by equation
(14)), is measured as absolute changes. Everything else is measured as the ratio of year-
2000 values to year-1959 values. Notice that the enrollment of the existing cohort in 2000,
e2000
0 = 0.244, is much higher than enrollment in 1959, e1959
0 = 0.077. Therefore, in the
absence of other changes, white-collar skill becomes more abundant, which reduces the
skill premium (wW/wB) in each experiment. Notice from equation (2), capital and output
always change in the same proportion, and if A is ﬁxed, capital, aggregate labor (L) and
output always change in the same proportion.
19Table 7: Eﬀects of parameter changes–Transition
data model ω only A only d only
Y 2.29 2.29 1.20 1.86 0.98
K 2.29 2.29 1.20 1.86 0.98
W - 2.72 2.72 2.82 2.82
B - 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.83
L - 1.20 1.20 0.98 0.98
c/Y 1.06 1.06 1.16 0.50 0.62
mwr 1.26 1.26 1.26 0.37 0.37
wW/wB - 1.44 1.44 0.43 0.43
e1 0.197 0.197 0.198 -0.144 -0.144
e 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.141 0.141
Note: Table shows ratio of year-2000 values to year-
1959 values, except for enrollment (e1 and e),
which are expressed as absolute changes.
An increase in ω increases the demand for white-collar workers and decreases the
demand for blue-collar workers. The increase in demand is bigger than the increase in
supply from the older cohorts (e0) found in the data, and the skill premium rises. As
a result, the college enrollment of the youngest cohort increases, by almost the same
amount as in the full model. Changing ω also reweights W and B in the computation of
L. Aggregate labor increases, leading capital and output to increase as well.11 With an
increase in the white-collar wage, college costs also increase.
A skill-neutral increase in A increases the demand for capital, white-collar skill and
blue-collar skill. As indicated in equation (2), capital increases relatively more than aggre-
gate labor. Because e0 increases, white-collar skill increases relative to its 1959 value, and
with ω unchanged the skill premium drops. The college enrollment of the youngest cohort
drops to zero. Because college students are not yet working, an decrease in enrollment
increases the amount of blue-collar skill supplied by young workers without decreasing
the immediate supply of white-collar skill. Lower enrollment also releases white-collar
skill from the provision of higher education. The aggregate supply of both blue-collar
and white-collar labor thus increase relative to the full model. Capital and output both
increase a lot. With an excess of white-collar skill depressing white-collar wages, and
11Holding W and B ﬁxed, the eﬀects of changing ω on the composite L depend on the relative sizes of
W and B, which in turn depend on the normalizations used to scale W and B in the calibration. With
diﬀerent scaling, increases in ω can cause L to fall.
20output having grown relative to capital needs (EK), college costs drop dramatically.
An increase in d is a reduction in the tuition discount rate or, equivalently, an increase
in net tuition. Higher net tuition discourages college enrollment, and the reduction in
the skill premium caused by the increase in e0 drives enrollment to zero.
5.2 In Steady State
In solving the transition model, we assume that agents predict their future earnings
myopically. An alternative approach is to assume that the economy is in a steady state,
so that myopic expectations are fully rational. We thus revise our experiments, using
the same parameter values but assuming that the economy is in a steady-state in both
1959 and 2000. We do so by requiring that all cohorts have the same enrollment rate,
e0 = e1 = e, which they choose optimally. We ﬁrst compute steady-state equilibria for
1959 and 2000, and then conduct the same decomposition as before. We ﬁnd that when
all the parameter changes are considered together, the transition and steady-state versions
of the model deliver similar results. The results for the decomposition exercises diﬀer
more.
Table 7 shows the results. Notice from equation (2) that capital and output always
change in the same proportion, and if A is ﬁxed, capital, aggregate labor and output
always change in the same proportion.
Relative to the benchmark transition model, in the steady state for 1959, enrollment
for the older cohorts is higher and enrollment for the youngest cohort is lower. Average
enrollment (e) is modestly higher in the steady state model. In the transition model,
e1959 = 8.3%; in the steady state the corresponding value is 8.6%. The total stock
of white-collar skill is higher in the steady state because less skill is used in the higher
education sector and also because there is a larger existing stock of skill held by older
cohorts, due to their higher enrollment. Treating 1959 as a steady state generates a lower
stock of blue-collar skill for older cohorts but increases that of the new cohort, who are now
less likely to attend college. The second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst, and total blue-collar
skill increases. Since both blue-collar skill and white-collar skill increase, aggregate labor
increases. As a result, the total stock of capital is higher than in the benchmark model.
While both types of skill increase, white-collar skill becomes relatively more abundant, so
that the cost of college and the mean wage ratio are lower than in the benchmark model.
The changes in the relative supply of skills, however, have small eﬀects on total labor
inputs (L) or output. For example, output for 1959 is $26,700 in the benchmark model
and $27,000 in the steady state.
21Table 8: Eﬀects of parameter changes–Steady state
2000/1959 ratios
1959 2000 total ω only A only d only
Y 2.70 6.25 2.31 1.21 1.91 1.0000
K 7.20 16.65 2.31 1.21 1.91 1.0000
W 1.127 3.10 2.75 2.74 1.00 0.9995
B 0.996 0.763 0.77 0.77 1.00 1.0001
L 1.01 1.23 1.21 1.21 1.00 1.0000
c/Y 0.315 0.327 1.04 1.14 0.87 1.0003
mwr 1.50 1.77 1.18 1.18 1.00 1.0004
wW/wB 0.112 0.155 1.39 1.39 1.00 1.0004
e 0.086 0.285 0.199 0.199 0.00 -0.000048
Note: Output and capital are measured in 10,000s of $2005.
Final 4 columns show ratio of year-2000 values to
year-1959 values, except for enrollment (e), which is
expressed as an absolute change.
The comparison between the year-2000 steady state reported in Table 8 and the year-
2000 economy in transition reported in Table 6 is similar to the comparison for 1959. It
follows that the changes from the year-1959 steady state to the year-2000 steady state are
similar to the changes for the transition model reported in Table 7.
The steady state decomposition shows that the increase in enrollment is almost entirely
due to skill-biased technological change. An isolated increase in ω reduces the marginal
product of blue-collar workers, resulting in a reduction of blue-collar skill and a increase
in the skill premium. Enrollment increases and blue-collar skill decreases a lot. The cost
of college rises signiﬁcantly.
A skill-neutral increase of A increases the demand for capital, and both types of skill.
The cost of college drops because output has grown relative to capital inputs, EK. In a
steady state, this drop in costs has a negligible eﬀect on college attainment. During the
transition, the current prices of blue- and white-collar skill aﬀect the enrollment decisions
of only the youngest cohort. In a steady state, relative skill prices aﬀect enrollment
across all cohorts, making the aggregate quantity of skill much more elastic. As a result,
changes in the tuition discount rate are largely oﬀset by changes in skill prices, and have
little eﬀect on steady-state attainment. Labor inputs and wages change only slightly. It
then follows from equation (2) that the increase in output and capital is almost exactly
22(A2000/A1959)1/(1−α).
If tuition as fraction of cost rises from 0.2363 to 0.2426, enrollment decreases slightly,
resulting in more blue-collar skill and less white-collar skill in the steady state. As a
result, the skill premium and the relative price increase. The cost of higher education
also increases, reinforcing the eﬀect of smaller tuition discounts. The overall eﬀect is
very small, however, because of general equilibrium eﬀects. In particular, we ﬁnd that
a 0.825% decrease in the tuition discount rate (1 − d) results in a 0.056% decrease in
enrollment, implying an elasticity of 0.07. The standard price elasticity, based on d itself,
is 0.02.12 More radical experiments, such as setting d = 0 or d = 1, produce elasticities
of similar magnitudes. As Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998b) note, changes in wages,
which accumulate over an individual’s entire working life, almost completely oﬀset the
changes in net tuition. In contrast, a number of empirical studies, based on micro-level
interventions, ﬁnd larger eﬀects. (See Dynarski, 2003, and the papers referenced therein.)
When wages are held ﬁxed in our model, the enrollment elasticities rise from 0.07 to 0.45,
and from 0.02 to 0.14. By way of comparison, Dynarski (2003) ﬁnds that the enrollment
elasticity to total “schooling costs” is 1.5. Because most of this cost total consists of
forgone earnings, Dynarski’s estimates imply a tuition elasticity of 0.14, similar to ours.13
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we show that a simple general equilibrium model with skill- and sector-
biased technological change can replicate the increase in college costs observed over the
past 40 years, along with the increase in college attainment and the increase in the relative
wages earned by college graduates. Our model has two key features. The ﬁrst is
the assumption that educating a student requires a ﬁxed amount of capital and skilled
labor. The second is skill-biased technological change. We ﬁnd that in general equilibrium
changes in college prices, measured as changes in the tuition discount rate, have little long-
run eﬀect on human capital accumulation.
An important limitation to the current analysis is that we model the endpoints of the
1959-2000 transition, rather than the entire trajectory. This restriction also leads us to
assume that agents predict the returns to college myopically. Although our expectation
is that our main ﬁndings do not depend on these assumptions, a full dynamic analysis is
12The exact calculation is [−0.000048/0.0859]/[(0.7574−0.7637)/0.7637] = 0.068. The more standard
price elasticity is 0.00056/[(0.2426 − 0.2363)/0.2363] = 0.021.
13Dynarski ﬁnds tuition and fees to be $1,900, while foregone earnings are $18,500, implying that her
tuition elasticity is 1.5 × (1900/(1900 + 18500)).
23in order.
Our framework suggests that skill-biased technological change makes a college educa-
tion more expensive as well as more valuable. The scope for policy intervention is limited,
however, if college enrollment is as inelastic to tuition discounts as our model implies. A
number of empirical studies suggest that college attendance is sensitive to tuition, at least
over the shorter-term. One reason why enrollment may be more price elastic than we
predict is that borrowing limits may prevent students from paying higher tuitions. A
number of studies, including Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001) and Cameron and Taber
(2004) conclude that borrowing constraints do not signiﬁcantly restrict college attendance.
Keane and Wolpin (2001) argue that although the borrowing constraints that students
face are quite strict, students can circumvent them by working. In contrast, Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo (2010) ﬁnd that while credit constraints might not have restricted
access in the past, they probably restrict access now. They also stress the importance
of modelling these credit constraints in a way consistent with the actual student lending
process. Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2011) ﬁnd that students not receiving the “ex-
pected” amount of parental transfers (as deﬁned in Federal ﬁnancial aid formulae) are
often ﬁnancially constrained.
Another feature missing in our model is drop-out risk. Although 52% of the people
aged 25 and older in 2000 had attended college, only 31% had earned a degree of any
sort. Akyol and Athreya (2005) ﬁnd that switching from a full tuition subsidy to none
typically reduces the fraction of skilled workers by 5 to 7 percentage points. Ionescu (2009)
ﬁnds that introducing ﬂexibility in the repayment of Federal student loans signiﬁcantly
increases enrollment.
The model can also be enriched by introducing more heterogeneity in higher education,
both in terms of quality and its price. As emphasized by Castro and Coen-Pirani (2011),
there are signiﬁcant quality diﬀerences both between public and private institutions, and
within each group. Even at a single institution, individuals with diﬀerent levels of ability
and family income usually face diﬀerent prices.
7 Appendix: Background Calculations
7.1 Measurement Issues
In this section we consider some alternative versions of our education measures.
Figure 7 shows the eﬀects of excluding scholarships and fellowships from our deﬁ-
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Figure 7
nition of education and general expenditures. Because the revisions in the late 1990s
eliminated scholarships and fellowships data for private institutions, we use the College
Board’s measure of aggregate institutional grant aid to extrapolate aggregate scholarships
and fellowships to the present. Figure 7 reveals that scholarships and fellowships appear
to have become increasingly important over time. In 2008, they equalled almost 4 per-
cent of per worker GDP. Their eﬀect appears to be most prevalent in private institutions,
although this data is poorly measured.14 As Table 4 shows, however, excluding scholar-
ships and fellowships from our cost measures has only a modest eﬀect on our calibration
targets.
A second data issue involves the measurement of tuition. The tuition data shown in
Figures 1 and 4 are found by dividing tuition revenues by FTE. This measure is consistent
with our measure of costs, and it can be extrapolated back to 1929. Since 1964, however,
14We impute the missing data for private institutions in two steps. First, we use the College Board’s
measure of aggregate institutional grant aid to extrapolate aggregate scholarships and fellowships to the
present. Second, we subtract from this measure public scholarships and fellowships, which we do observe,
leaving us with a residual that we treat as private aid.
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Figure 8
the Department of Education has estimated average undergraduate tuition, and since
1977, it has estimated average undergraduate tuition at 4-year institutions. Figure 8
compares the two measures of tuition. Prior to the data revisions of 1995, the measures
moved together, with the revenue-based measures, which included graduate tuition, lying
above the tuition index. After 1995, the revenue-based measures have levelled oﬀ, while
the tuition indices have continued to grow. Over the period 1959-2000, however, the two
sets of measures imply similar changes in tuition.
267.2 Solving the model–in transition
We assume that the economy is in a transition in 2000. In each decomposition exper-
iment we ﬁx e2000
0 = 0.244 as in the data. We ﬁnd the year-2000 equilibrium h∗
1, e1, W,
B, K, Y , wW, wB as follows:
1. Make an initial guess of h∗
1
2. Get e1 from (10)
3. Get W from (15) and get B from (16), thus W/B
4. Get L from (1c)
5. Get K from (2)
6. Get Y from (1a)
7. Get wW from (4) and wB from (3)
8. Check (9), iterate over h∗
1 until convergence
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